Showing posts with label history. Show all posts
Showing posts with label history. Show all posts

Thursday, October 17, 2019

The Remembered Past in U.S. History

Below are my "class notes" (essentially a brief description for parents of what we've done in class thus far) for the first quarter of U.S. History. They provide a brief peek into how I teach my course.
Our theme in United States History is "the Remembered Past." Throughout the year we consider not only what happened in the past, but also how we remember past events differently at different times. We began the year with a unit reflecting on the nature and limits of history as a discipline, which culminated in an imaginative exercise in the interpretation of evidence: "A Post-Apocalyptic Historical Archaeologist Reads Two Plays and a Packet." 
Our second unit, which we wrapped up last week, introduced us more concretely to U.S. history through a brief survey of the interactions and relations between European colonists and Native Americans. Along with a unit test, we also had a group debate reflecting upon our unit through the lens of historical memory in public memorials. Students were required to make a case for memorializing one of four opposing figures (assigned, not chosen): John Winthrop, Anne Hutchinson, "King Philip," or the colonial victims of "King Philip's War." In doing so we not only researched individual figures; we also discussed (without resolving the question) whether monuments ought primarily to be reflections of past history or present values. 
We now turn our attention to the Founding Era, where we will consider the intra-colonial debate over independence, read a colonial midwife's diary in order to reflect upon whose stories are worth telling, and evaluate the historical reliability of Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, the text they are reading in American literature.

Friday, May 31, 2019

Teaching American History, Trusting Jesus

This is a "final reflections" email I sent to all my students after the conclusion of the semester. I know at least three (out of 65) actually read it, so I'll call that a teaching victory.


All,

This is the time of year I reflect on my teaching and think about, you know, the stuff I wish I'd done differently. So I'm gonna do that, and you're gonna read it. (Just kidding. You can go ahead and click that little trash can icon up there if you'd like.)

My major concerns always have to do with whether I've really upheld goodness, truth, and beauty for you to pursue. I'm not sure.

And part of the problem is that I simultaneously believe three things that are at least in tension with each other and may in fact be mutually exclusive:
  1. The "American experiment in self-government" is rooted in some fundamentally good, true, and beautiful insights that are worth preserving and upholding.
  2. Slavery and other forms of exploitation are inextricably interwoven into American history, such that it is hard to argue that there is any part of American history that hasn't been in some way affected.
  3. And then a third, sort of out-there one: the Western liberal (using the term broadly) Enlightenment-based ideal of a value-neutral, religious-commitment-free space (on which the American experiment is based) is a lie. There are no religiously neutral spaces; the secular state is not a neutral arbiter of religion but is itself a combatant (and a dominantly successful one) in religious conflict. (See the attached argument from William Cavanaugh--come for the invigorating take on the falsely named "Wars of Religion"; stick around for the part where he compares American government to a mafia protection racket.)
My overriding conviction always is that the Church -- which, as St. Paul repeatedly says, is the Body of Christ -- is the one community that should "relativize" all others. That is, all other loves find their rightful place and expression as they are brought into relation with Jesus Christ. Apart from Jesus, all loves inevitably become disordered, distorted, and destructive. Anything you pursue to give your lives meaning, purpose, and happiness apart from Jesus will eventually crumble into ash.

So your duty as Americans is indeed to love your country, just as you should love your family and friends. The problem is never -- could never be -- too much love. But it can be disordered love. Or it can be hatred or selfishness falsely masked as love. (That's why "love is love" can only mean something if you know what "love" actually is...) So your overriding duty is to find what loving America looks like when it's brought into relation with the fundamental commandment to love Jesus.

And I should say that bringing things into relation with Jesus is not a matter of hard things becoming easy. The whole "God loves you and has a wonderful plan for your life" line is true, so long as we remember that that "wonderful plan" might look quite a bit different than the wonderful plan we have for our own lives. Ten of the twelve disciples were martyred, after all.

The Christian life is cross-shaped. Jesus invites you into a real death to self, but it's through that dying to self that you find life -- and that, actually, you find yourself. The Collect for the Monday of Holy Week puts it well:

Capture.PNG

And that's the promise. You will suffer in this life, one way or another. Walking in the way of the cross means uniting your sufferings to Christ, who will never leave you nor forsake you (Heb. 13:5), so that when you suffer, you do so with hope and even, dare I say, joy (1 Thes. 4:13-18).

Best,
Fr. Perkins

Sunday, January 31, 2016

More grounds for hope in historical unpredictability

Today I read two sweeping narratives (one by Justo González, the other by Bishop John H. R. Moorman) of church history. I had to write a brief response as part of a class on Medieval and Reformation church history, which I thought I'd post here. Alfred the Great figured prominently in both narratives. The theme of my response resonates heavily with a theme I've thought about quite a bit over the last year--call it hope in historical unpredictability.

And there was death on the Emperor
And night upon the Pope;
And Alfred, hiding in deep grass,
Hardened his heart with hope. 
-G.K. Chesterton, 'The Ballad of the White Horse'
As I read through the tumultuous history of the Church from the 5th to the 12th centuries, I was struck by the ups and downs and radical reversals throughout the period. So many unexpected challenges arose, oftentimes just when things seemed to be settling down into a beautiful Christian ideal—the Vikings sweeping through Britain, wealth corrupting the Cluniacs, Islam overwhelming the core of ancient Christianity.

Of course that's discouraging from a Christian perspective. Yet I found myself oddly encouraged by what seemed like the sheer contingency of Christian history, the sense that everything so easily could have been radically different. For me, this historical grounding offers a great sense of hope and confidence.

So many today speak as though the Church were entering a period of unprecedented decline. That's true in the sense that every historical development is unique and unrepeatable. But the Church has weathered greater crises than what we now face, and those who speak of the past as though it were a wonderful period of consistent and universal Christian faith are misguided and misguiding.

As I see it, there are two common responses when faced with the messy complexity of the Church's history. One is to reject the messiness of reality in favor of a comforting fantasy—that the Church has been a solid, stable, monolithic, and unchanging presence from Jesus to Pope Francis. The other is the more postmodern choice: since the Church is historically contingent, the current state of things must be totally arbitrary. Both are lazy options, and both work from an unexamined premise—namely, that a Church reflecting the messiness of historical life cannot also be the true body of Christ.

The reality that things could be different should not drive us to delusion or despair but instead should spur us to gratitude and determination—gratitude for the goodness of our liturgy and common prayer as precious, fragile, and by no means inevitable gifts; determination to preserve the best and mend the worst in each of our churches.

Of course, victory is in the sovereign hands of God, who will accomplish his purposes, and who is ultimately responsible for the survival and health of our Church. As T.S. Eliot wrote in The Four Quartets, "For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business."

Wednesday, October 28, 2015

"World History in Two Minutes"


This little video has 19 million views on YouTube, so you may have already seen it--I just saw it this morning.

Although (because?) it's incredibly frenetic, it's effective affective: the images and soundtrack are illegally judiciously chosen and impressively synchronized.

A great deal of the power comes from the rushing onslaught of very familiar, vaguely familiar, and unfamiliar images thrown together. I experience a "microburst" of emotional and intellectual associations, for instance, when the famous image of the fleeing Vietnamese children and U.S. soldiers pops up. But before you can even begin to reflect consciously, the image flurry continues.

And the premises are fascinating. While you watch, think about what view of history it presents--and what is deemed important or insignificant based on what's included and emphasized, and what's left out.


A couple of my own immediate observations (I'd suggest watching it before reading my thoughts):

  • The sequencing of images presents a powerfully progressive view of history--mankind pulling ourselves up from the primordial slime into greatness. 
  • It's also very "presentist." Some of the omissions and emphases are frustrating; others are just plain amusing:
    • It covers the whole period from ancient Egypt to ~1900 in fifteen seconds, but the Second World War alone gets ten full seconds.
    • The First World War--"the Great War"--is completely skipped. 
    • The period from 1900-present is over half of the whole video.
    • We get more images of video games than we do of the entire Greco-Roman period!

Wednesday, September 2, 2015

Ken Burns' 'The Civil War' & The Lost Cause

John Fea--whose blog is a must-read for anyone interested in American history--linked today to a fascinating post about Ken Burns' The Civil War. In the linked post, historian Kevin Levin writes about The Civil War's "split personality":
[Shelby] Foote spoke 7,653 words compared to the second highest speaker, who spoke 1,112 words... His primary responsibility  was to comment on military matters and he did this quite effectively from telling colorful stories about the experiences of the common soldier in battle to waxing poetic about Nathan Bedford Forrest. He pushed a narrative that remains incredibly popular for people who for whatever reason would rather hold on to a personal memory of the war that is void of the story of slavery and emancipation. What’s left is a popular narrative of brave soldiers fighting for their respective causes. 
Shelby Foote was the star of this documentary and rightly so, but Burns ought to be able to acknowledge all these years later that the amount of air time he was given likely allowed certain viewers to slip through without fully coming to terms with the tough questions of slavery and race. 
I see The Civil War as a wonderful example of the split personality of Civil War memory. On the one hand Burns embraced and even anticipated a robust narrative that deals directly with the tough questions related to slavery and race – one that we’ve seen blossom during the the Civil War 150. At the same time Burns’s film reminds us of the difficulty of fully reconciling this narrative with a lingering Lost Cause narrative.
Ken Burns' The Civil War is my favorite documentary, hands down. Like Fea, I've seen it multiple times, and I'll be showing extended clips of it over the next month as my students study the Civil War. Having said that, it's also a documentary with some significant problems.

Kevin Levin's analysis is spot on. The Civil War reflects a significant break between Burns's own view and that of Foote. As Levin suggests, Foote's prominence owes a lot to his magnetism on screen, which is clear and undeniable. Foote is a master of the fascinating anecdote. I could listen to him talk for hours on end.

But he clearly subscribes to a hefty amount of Lost Cause mythology. As Levin suggests, slavery is constantly pushed to the periphery based on the banal observation that the average Confederate soldier wasn't a slaveowner (as though the causes of wars ever have much of anything to do with the motivations of foot soldiers). Nathan Bedford Forrest gets called an "authentic genius" without any acknowledgement of his post-war role. Foote is allowed to portray Lee as, basically, a kind-hearted fella who hated slavery when all recent research suggests that this is, at best, an absurd oversimplification.*

Burns clearly does not subscribe to Lost Cause mythology. Given that, he should have done a better job of balancing out or contextualizing Foote.

*For the record, I don't think the demonization of Lee as a monster is much better--but I just spent a year as a thesis adviser to a student who was trying to insist that Lee was basically a Southern abolitionist, which...

Thursday, July 9, 2015

Textbooks Standards and the Limits of Human Knowledge

Catastrophic evil grabs headlines. I tend to think, though, that we're less endangered by the comparatively rare instances of spectacular depravity than by the the toxic and altogether commonplace combination of arrogance and ignorance.

Consequently, what's most exasperating about neo-Confederates and their implicit fellow travelers is their utterly absurd and totally unjustified attitude of learned superiority. They defend a repugnant government. They idolize an evil society. But what I find most annoying--rather than horrifying--is the arrogance with which they proclaim their ignorance. Historically indefensible attempts to minimize the centrality of slavery to the Confederate cause are invariably followed by the pompous demand that their opponents "read some history."

Look, I know history is complex, and that all generalizations in historical study overlook caveats and nuance and exceptions to the rule. But unless we're to do away with generalization altogether--in which case the study of history would not exist, and in its place we'd have archival cataloguing of meaningless and disconnected scraps of information--we have to live with some degree of simplification. As John Lukacs is fond of saying, "Generalizations are like brooms--they're meant to sweep."

So we must generalize at times and in places or give up on historical study. Given this inevitability, we simply have to evaluate which generalizations are more justified and which are less. And if there ever was a defensible, sweepingly true generalization, it's this: the Confederate states seceded and fought a war to defend, extend, and perpetuate an economic and social system defined by--founded and entirely dependent upon--race-based chattel slavery.

The historical evidence is overwhelming--from the declarations of secession to the arguments of southern secession commissioners to the statements of the major political figures of the Confederate States of America to the Confederate Constitution. Meanwhile, alternate theories are indefensible--bad faith distortions largely manufactured by Lost Causers after 1865 as a fig leaf to disguise their slavery-centered revolt. Southern states and the C.S.A. were eager to trample states' rights in defense of slavery. The Fugitive Slave Act, for instance, was arguably the most invasive federal law ever passed. The tariff was lower in the 1850s than in most of the previous decades,* and references to it among secessionists were sporadic and inconsistent. It's true that during the Civil War Abraham Lincoln acted outside of Constitutional bounds, but as the war went on so too did Jefferson Davis and the Confederate government concentrate power at the federal level at the expense of the states.**

It was with great interest, then, that I listened to Diane Rheem's show yesterday on the Texas textbook kerfuffle.*** Obviously I have very little sympathy with those who wish to believe that states' rights was just as central to secession as slavery--much less with those who want nonsensically to treat slavery as a "side issue."

As the panelists discussed the Texas textbook standards--which certainly appear to be frankly ridiculous--a vision of a universalized, national history education emerged from some as the solution to the Texas problem. Early on, Diane Rheem asked, "But wouldn't you think there would be sort of a standardized history text that every child in America would learn the same things about?" Throughout the show, various panelists lamented that this was not the case.

As repugnant as Texas' standards appear to be, I also have to admit that I am deeply uncomfortable with this nationalized vision for historical education. Rheem and her panelists are unconsciously subscribing to the notion that if we just get enough experts together, we can conjure up one single historical account that should suffice to explain everything to everyone.

Monday, July 6, 2015

Judging prophetic claims about history

"Good to be in the right church and on the right side of history."

I read that in all of its intense and righteous self-satisfaction, and I thought of Mrs. Turpin from Flannery O'Connor's "Revelation":
To help anybody out that needed it was her philosophy of life. She never spared herself when she found somebody in need, whether they were white or black, trash or decent. And of all she had to be thankful for, she was most thankful that this was so. If Jesus had said, "You can be high society and have all the money you want and be thin and svelte-like, but you can't be a good woman with it," she would have had to say, "Well don't make me that then. Make me a good woman and it don’t matter what else, how fat or how ugly or how poor!" Her heart rose. He had not made her a nigger or white-trash or ugly! He had made her herself and given her a little of everything. Jesus, thank you! she said. Thank you thank you! Whenever she counted her blessings she felt as buoyant as if she weighed one hundred and twenty five pounds instead of one hundred and eighty.
Mrs. Turpin's fate was to be set upon and, ultimately, set right by the ultimately-not-ironically-named Mary Grace. In absolutely no way do I wish Mary Grace's violence upon the author of those words, but I am always taken aback by the exaggerated sense of rightness in such proclamations.

 A long time ago I thought that claims about right and wrong sides to history were essentially about "a progressive view of history, whereby the superior moral standing of later generations exposes the errors of the past."* I still think that's true, but what stands out to me now is the way that a progressive vision of history functions essentially as an article of faith, entirely and wholly apart from any connection to lived history. I'm interested, in other words, in the religious zealotry that underlies progressive history.

In my last post on "Hope in historical unpredictability," I pointed out that those who make claims about sides to history "aren't making 'historical' claims, in the sense that they can be proven or supported with reference to past history. Whether the proclaimers recognize it or not, such assertions are fundamentally prophetic. That is, they are making a claim about the purposes and intentions of the author of history."

In that post, I more or less implied that statements about the right or wrong side of history should be simply ignored entirely. But that's not particularly charitable, nor am I sure it's prudent.

If, as I suggested, they are not historical claims, then they cannot be investigated and then either confirmed or falsified via the study of history. So, then, how can we evaluate them?

The answer, I humbly suggest, is to evaluate them as what they are: prophetic claims. The speaker of such claims is, essentially, claiming to be a mouthpiece for the author of history. And as I concluded my last post, "the author of history either does not exist or he is God Almighty."

It's worth noting here that prophecy in Scripture is not really about mystically predicting the future. It's about speaking God's truth, which needn't but may sometimes involve proclamations of future judgment. But in either case, the prophet speaks for God.

How, then, would you respond if someone claimed to be speaking on behalf of God?

If you do not buy into prophetic claims in general--perhaps you are an atheist or agnostic or deist or what have you, or perhaps instead you are simply a Christian who thinks prophecy ceased after the New Testament--then you can simply disregard claims about sides to history altogether. You should grant them no more credence or meaning than you assign to your average sign-waving apocalypticist shouting on a street corner.

Things are more complicated if you do not dismiss all prophetic claims out of hand.

In his essay on "Historicism," C.S. Lewis implies that a prophetic claim about history should come "with supporting evidence by way of sanctity and miracles"--and suggests that he is not capable of judging in such an instance. Presumably, Lewis saw that as the job of the Church. That is pretty much what I think--that prophetic claims ought ultimately to be judged by the Church.**

But there are places where the Church has already spoken--where Scripture is resoundingly clear, or where ecumenical councils have made relevant statements, or where the common prayer and practice of the Church make a conclusion unavoidable. And we know, as I've said before, how the story ends.

So, I'd humbly suggest, if someone's claiming that the author of history is saying something in contradiction to what we know to be true about God or what we know to be true about the end of the story, then we can safely reject it as nonsense.

---

*At the time I noted another possibility: Perhaps the man who was shouting about the wrong side of history wasn't really a believer in History as Progress. "Perhaps," I wrote, "he fancies himself a hardened realist. He's merely stating that victors get first dibs at writing history textbooks, and he intends to win. He intends, in other words, to sit in the chair, become the power that be is? and say what's what." He's saying, in other words,  that you'll be on the wrong side of history because I'm going to make sure you lose, and then I'll write the history of your defeat. I wrote that with my tongue firmly planted in cheek, but now I'm not so sure that's an implausible reading. In fact I think it's likely that faith in History as Progress goes hand-in-hand with the desire to demonize, defeat, and annihilate the Enemies of Progress.
**In response to this post, Daniel Silliman has rightly pointed out that the two options I've outlined do not fairly cover the possible responses to prophetic claims. He's absolutely correct, and I did not mean to suggest that wholesale dismissal and "the church should judge" are the only possible responses. Many evangelicals, for example, might respond that each individual should judge by Scripture and the guidance of the Holy Spirit. I merely want to say that claims about the sides of history should be weighed in the same manner as you would judge religious claims--however you do so. My primary targets--to drop the whole indirect pretense real quick--are those who think religious claims are fine as privately held beliefs but have no place in the public square, yet also bludgeon their political opponents with "wrong side of history" language.

Thursday, June 25, 2015

Hope in historical unpredictability

The fellas over at First Things--along with their allies and fellow travelers (and, uh, frenemies) are quite a gloomy lot these days. There's a distinct sense that orthodox Christianity is doomed in American society. Many in this cohort have shifted their attention from strategies of engagement in the public square to how best to deal with impending exile from mainstream American life. The so-called "Benedict Option," articulated most popularly by Rod Dreher, has been gaining traction. Michael Hanby's profoundly despairing essay on "The Civic Project of American Christianity" was widely and heatedly discussed.

It is in this context, then, that I find Michael Brendan Dougherty's most recent column at The Week rather refreshing. Dougherty essentially says two things.

He points out how many seemingly unstoppable trends in the past half century or so were reversed or undone in ways no one predicted:
But history has surprising turns, ones that can be hard to see even in retrospect. It is possible to imagine a future in which 2015 doesn't augur the beginning of conservatism's final descent, but instead represents a temporary nadir. 
...Many Cold War conservatives were convinced that communism would triumph over the West. Conservatives of the late 1980s and '90s thought that the increasing crassness of popular culture and the rise in crime were related and unstoppable. Entirely wrong, all.
Dougherty then highlights many societal trends that, while apparently secular and anti- or post-Christian in nature, have surprising resonance with the concerns of conservative Christians. He points to feminism's relatively recent turn away from unfettered sexual libertinism and towards a genuine concern over the destructiveness and danger of casual sex. He notes that "the desire for organic, natural, and sustainable products" should be very amenable to true conservatism--which should be about conserving, after all. He highlights the ways that union organizers resists statism and New Urbanism emphasizes humane scale and beauty. In short, not all is bleak.

A decade ago, historian John Lukacs saw these surprising convergences. "A great division among the American people," Lukacs wrote, "has begun--gradually, slowly--to take shape: not between Republicans and Democrats, and not between 'conservatives' and 'liberals,' but between people who are still unthinking believers in technology and economic determinism and people who are not." Later in the same book, he quoted Wendell Berry's similar thoughts. "It is easy for me to imagine," said Berry, "that the next great division will be between people who wish to live as creatures and people who wish to live as machines."

Ultimately, though, the particular hopeful trends Dougherty mentions are less important than his other, more basic concept. History is unpredictable. Trends that seem unstoppable stop. New trends emerge from totally unexpected places.

Some years ago I wrote some thoughts about Tina Fey, Mark Twain, and racism:
Consider: if we today have problems discerning whether 30 Rock is racist, imagine how much more difficult this would be in a century. When people with inevitably different perspectives from another culture with its own constructions of race and society attempts to parse commentary, humor, and racism within 30 Rock, some of them are likely to think, wrongly, "Wow, that is actually pretty racist." And if, in one hundred years, that discussion actually is occurring, Tina Fey's work and legacy will have approached Mark Twain's. 
I later connected that thought with a broader point about the unpredictable judgments of our progeny--the frightening reality that what we see as our best, most "forward-thinking" qualities might come in for vociferous condemnation somewhere down the line:
At the end of last year I wrote that Tina Fey's not-controversial-except-to-neocon-pundits joke about Mark Twain might actually be a brilliant anticipation of the totally unfair ways we'll be judged by our descendants. And it's that unpredictability--turning a prescient, humane condemnation of racism into racism itself--that makes me think worrying too much about our grandchildren's judgment is a waste of time. They'll probably have bad taste.
More to the point today: we surely needn't worry about those proclaiming right and wrong sides to history. After all, they aren't making "historical" claims, in the sense that they can be proven or supported with reference to past history. Whether the proclaimers recognize it or not, such assertions are fundamentally prophetic. That is, they are making a claim about the purposes and intentions of the author of history.

And the author of history either does not exist or he is God Almighty.

Friday, March 20, 2015

History and the Exodus

In the past year or so I've become increasingly interested in the historicity of the Old Testament. I have long been thinking about the role of story in the life of the Church more generally, but my interest in the particular nature of Old Testament stories has grown more recently. One question I'm often thinking and rethinking is that of the relationship between those stories and history. Should, more specifically, the Old Testament's historical reliability affect--whether adversely or positively--the Christian's confidence in Holy Scripture? How should the Christian react to claims about the historicity of the Old Testament?

That question is far too complicated for any blog post by any writer, and it's obviously beyond my training and intelligence. But I do think there are a couple of workable "ground rules" from which to operate--or, maybe, a couple of pitfalls to avoid.

To begin with, it is important that we acknowledge our own limitations. We have to start by recognizing that many "problems" of biblical reliability are in fact problems of our own making--due not to the text itself but to our own errant interpretations and inevitably incomplete knowledge. It may be the case, for instance, that the apparent conflict between contemporary science on origins and the Book of Genesis has less to do with Scripture per se and more to do with modernist assumptions inherent in fundamentalism.

To take another example, when we expect ancient authors to use numbers in a consistently straightforward way, we may be anachronistically applying contemporary expectations to a foreign context. Ancient authors' use numbers in symbolic or indirect way--even when we cannot quite penetrate or understand the symbolism--should not be seen as inaccuracy or falsehood. This is analogous to, say, criticizing someone for using the phrase "sunrise" when the "objective truth" of the matter is that the earth is spinning rather than the sun rising. In both origins and numbers the same basic concept is at work: rather than attempting to understand a text on its own historical terms, we superimpose our own expectations of how (we assume) numbers ought to work. And when it turns out that the author is using numbers differently than expected, we're likely to accuse them of inaccuracy and unreliability.*

*Of course, I have objections to a whole set of ideas about "objectivity" at work here--namely, the assumption that "perspective" (the human being watching the sun rise) is irrelevant or inaccurate. But that's for another time.

What I mean is that you must try, so far as possible, to judge Scripture on its own terms, rather than imposing your own modern historical or scientific expectations onto it--expectations that might have been absurd, if not completely meaningless, to an ancient audience.  This does not mean, though, that historical unreliability in Scripture would be insignificant to the Christian. This does not mean, to push to the other extreme, that I am comfortable with the progressive move to reduce all of Scripture to "spiritual truths" that persist even if the claim the text makes is false. If you wish to read a text on its own terms, you have to take its claims seriously. The attempt to "spiritualize"--and thereby neutralize--the truth claims of Scripture is no less anachronistic than the most benighted fundamentalist interpretation out there.

It's with this in mind that I've been reading the fascinating conversation developing around a recent essay in Mosaic Magazine disputing the widespread scholarly dismissal of the Exodus story's historicity. Gerry McDermott's blog, The Northampton Seminar, directed me towards the initial essay, which uses two separate approaches to argue for the historical reality--at least to some extent--of the Exodus story. On the one hand, Joshua Berman, professor of Bible at Bar-Ilan University, undercuts the premises and assumptions at play in the dismissal of the Exodus story. He then offers up old and new evidence to support the historicity of both the Hebrew sojourn in Egypt and the subsequent Exodus.

Thursday, February 26, 2015

Terry Gross, Eric Foner... and Justice Scalia?

So midway through the Fresh Air interview, Terry Gross starts asking Eric Foner about the dangers faced by blacks living in antebellum New York City. Of course runaway slaves could be captured and forced back into slavery, but legally free blacks also had to fear being seized and sold into slavery by kidnapping rings. Last year, the film 12 Years a Slave drew international attention to the plight of Solomon Northup and others like him who faced such a fate.

Terry Gross then brings up the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which is--by my lights anyway--one of the most compelling and disturbing things in all of American history. Foner notes that the Act built on the so-called "runaway slave clause" in the Constitution. But he also points out that the runaway slave clause--and all the laws passed in the six decades following the Constitution's ratification--proved rather ambiguous and difficult to enforce. The difficulties became even greater as northern states passed "personal liberty laws" that all but nullified the runaway slave clause.

The Fugitive Slave Act ended all that ambiguity in shocking fashion. It overruled state laws, made local law enforcement officers party to slave-hunting, and even required--with the threat of fines or imprisonment--private citizens to assist federal officials in hunting runaway slaves. More on the F.S.A. shortly.

Gross and Foner move to a new topic for a few minutes--Gross asks Foner if there are certain myths about the Underground Railroad he wants to debunk, which he gladly does. Then Gross suddenly shifts back to the Constitution and asks a very bad question. A dumb question. Perhaps even disingenuous. Or maybe I'm exaggerating things (me?never!), and it was merely a silly question. Well, anyway, here it is:

Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Losing Our Digital Selves

Everything I wrote in high school, college, and graduate school lies hidden somewhere in this room.

The hiddenness is two-fold: physical and digital. I'm not sure of the actual location of the external hard drive on which my papers and essays are stored. But with a little effort I would undoubtedly find it. More significant—more confounding—than the tangible and physical hiding place of the hard drive is the inaccessibility of its data.

A year or so ago I bought a new less-old used laptop from my Dad. It wasn't until after I gave away my old laptop to one of his friends that I realized my new laptop lacks the outdated firewire hookup required to plug in my old hard drive.

Trapezoid-on-rectangle peg, meet rectangular hole.

So now this once-very-expensive hard drive now has all the functionality of a paperweight for me. Of course, I should still be able to extract my data from the hard drive by borrowing someone's older laptop. But I'm pretty good at procrastinating—how long before my hard drive becomes the floppy disk of bling?

I mostly don't think about the hard drive at all—how often do you think about things you wrote in a previous life? But recently I've had occasion to remember that hard drive, to feel the rise of subtle stomach-stirring panic at the thought of losing it all.

A couple weeks ago our President's comments on ISIS gave me occasion to think about the Spanish Inquisition, and I remembered that I have no access to relevant grad work. Then yesterday The Hedgehog Review posted a short essay by B.D. McClay on the odd, contradictory effects of digitization. McClay notes that much contemporary handwringing about our social-media selves focuses on the permanence of our digital words and deeds—"the idea that, for instance, an unkind or embarrassing action could linger on and haunt us long beyond any reasonable amount of time."

As I teacher, I do worry for my students. Every so often—usually when I'm trying to find out the score of a basketball or soccer game—I stumble across the world of high school Twitter. It is a dark place, friends—inane at its best, horrifying at its worst. This is not to suggest that "back in my day" kids were wiser or purer, but there is a difference between spoken stupidity and posting your foolishness on public social media.

But as a history teacher, I worry more about the transience of our information. McClay points out that, while the Internet and the digital world may indeed retain things we would rather see disappear, it also has great potential to swallow wholesale things we expect to last. I once used Google Reader as a digital filing cabinet of sorts. When Google regrettably shut down Reader a few years ago, I dutifully downloaded my archive, which lies untouched and unreadable on this laptop... or is it in the hard drive?

The jumping off point for McClay's essay is a speech from a Google vice president warning that our obsessive digitization might actually destroy rather than prolong all our records. This is not a new thought. As McClay notes, novelist and essayist Nicholson Baker has been protesting against the digitization and destruction of archived newspapers for nearly two decades. But to hear it from Internet nobility, from a prince of the digital empire, is a bit jarring.

A few years ago, when I was still in graduate school, I started writing for The Sad Bear ("Correspondence between nerds. Everything from journalism and philosophy to rock n' roll and maps. Especially maps."). In my inaugural essay, I reflected on the differences between the work of early modern and late modern historians, and I ventured some thoughts about what future historians might wrestle with as they try to read our age:
Early modern historians wrestle with a paucity of evidence and generally end up trying to say quite a bit with very little to go on. Historians of the 20th-century have the opposite problem. By many measures—not necessarily all—the amount of potential historical evidence created today outpaces that of entire centuries only a few hundred years ago. I think constantly about what kind of evidence we're leaving behind of ourselves, and how it will be interpreted by later cultures. 
How much, I wonder, will survive and in what form? Though I'm no sign-waving apocalypticist, I don't find the total collapse of our civilization an impossibility. It's conceivable that the digital world we've constructed could be permanently and irrevocably lost. When I entertain such thoughts, I find suddenly terrifying our digitizing of everything. In this potential future, some historian will no doubt pen eloquent lines about our Eternal-Sunshine-esque erasure of worlds, our deliberate and orderly destruction of the evidence of our existence.
The Sad Bear fell into disuse and decrepitude not long after I started writing there—I'm not sure what conclusions should be drawn from this, uh, correlation. It's all but dead now. There are still nine of us listed as contributors, but nothing was posted there in the entirety of 2014. Perhaps it will be revived at some future date, though that seems doubtful. But it, like this blog, will live on until Google decides to shut down Blogger like it eliminated Reader—or until Google itself folds.

But if I want permanent access to my writing from The Sad Bear or to this blog—and if I want to be able to read my old academic work—I'm going to have to make intentional and indeed perpetual efforts. McClay suggests that we should be far less confident in the permanence of our digital records—and more intentional in preserving what matters:
...for those of us archiving things of our own that are merely important to us, Cerf’s comments come as a reminder that preservation can’t simply be left to chance or to a technological infrastructure that we trust too much... What we really desire to bring with us into the future, we will have to bring on purpose; the things we wish to remember, we are going to have to choose.
Indeed.

Some of my essays and papers are actually veiled in a third layer of hiddenness. In high school, I wrote using whatever word processing program Apple had going back in the early 2000s—"Apple Works" or "Apple Word" or something. Even before I lost access to my hard drive, I lost the ability to open or read those essays.

They're still sitting inscrutably encoded on an inaccessible hard drive gathering dust somewhere in this room.

Saturday, February 7, 2015

Jim Crow, the Crusades, and the Inquisition

Some are taking umbrage at President Obama's recent Prayer Breakfast statements, in which he condemned the violence of ISIS but then drew something of a line of equivalence between the Islamic terrorism of ISIS and past evidence's of Christian violence:
“And lest we get on our high horse and think this is unique to some other place, remember that during the Crusades and the Inquisition, people committed terrible deeds in the name of Christ. In our home country, slavery and Jim Crow all too often was justified in the name of Christ.”
Predictably, lots of conservatives--and lots of Christians--did not take kindly to the president's words.

Two quick thoughts: First, the comparison to the violence of Jim Crow is apt, to a certain degree. Some time ago I excerpted from and linked to Daniel Silliman's horrifying, brutal, and powerful post on "Sam Hose's Christian America." Daniel wrote:
All that talk, however, of that imagined idyllic past when Biblical morality was given due deference and Christians had a respected place in the public square is haunted by the Sunday when churchgoers came back from a place called Old Troutman Field with bits of Sam Hose's chopped-up body. 
More:
Because this was America, a Christian country, the Sunday crowd that killed Sam Hose was coming from church. More than 500 came from nearby Newnan. Hundreds came from Palmetto, a city slightly to the north. Word of the in-progress lynching reached Atlanta right as people were leaving their morning worship services. According to historian Philip Dray, the news sparked "a mad rush of worshippers to the train station seeking the swiftest possible passage" to the lynching.
Does this make it religious violence? Not on its own, perhaps, but the name "Christian Knights" didn't come from nowhere, nor, as Ta-Nehisi Coats pointed out on Twitter, is it entirely irrelevant that they burned, you know, crosses. Americans--perhaps especially Christian Americans--should do a better job of coming to terms with the horrific injustice and violence of Jim Crow America. An encouraging point on that front is the Gospel Coalition's recently announced forum on the place of Southern evangelicals in the Jim Crow South. Whether or not Jim Crow violence is attributable to Christianity somehow, it should at least give Christians pause before condemning Islam per se for the violence of ISIS.

My second response, following quickly, was that the Crusades and especially the Inquisition actually provide a less apt comparison for the violence of ISIS. I responded to TNC on Twitter suggesting that the latter comparisons represented bad and "outdated" history, which in turn drew a reply from him:
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the comparison is "outdated" because the Crusades or the Inquisition happened a really long time ago. What I do mean is that such comparisons usually involve oversimplification and Whiggish distortions of history designed, mainly, to make Catholics look really bad in comparison with WASPish uprightness.

I don't want to get into the Crusades. Frankly, I have only a passing familiarity with the period. Here I'll just point to Bernard Lewis' quote comparing jihad to the Crusades in my recent--and very long--post on Lewis' The Crisis of Islam. Put briefly: there's a comparison to be made between the Muslim concept of jihad and the Crusades, but certainly no equivalence. But President Obama was comparing the specific actions of ISIS rather than the concept of jihad to the Crusades. And as Lewis points out, there are stark and even irreconcilable differences between the concept of jihad as understood and practiced through Islamic history and jurisprudence and the violent Islamic terrorism of the half-century. So President Obama's comparison lacks subtlety, to say the least.

As I did some graduate work on Iberian Catholicism and the Spanish Inquisition, I feel more confident to speak on the dramatic dissimilarity between the Spanish Inquisition and ISIS.* In popular imagination we still think of the Inquisition as a court awash in the blood of countless thousands. We think of it as an instrument that struck terror in the hearts of all Spanish people, and as a holdover from benighted Dark Ages religiosity.

Nearly a half-century ago Richard Kamen's landmark book The Spanish Inquisition upended that story. Practically every study since then--even critical ones--have upheld these basic points of Kamen's work:
  1. The Spanish Inquisition was, by contemporary standards, a restrained and relatively bloodless court following the rule of law. Granted, the laws of early modern Spain hardly measure up to liberal democratic ideals, but nevertheless the Inquisition was not bloodthirsty lawlessness run amok.
  2. The Spanish Inquisition was not feared but rather welcomed by the majority of the Spanish people. It generally came to towns not so much as a monarchical (much less ecclesial) imposition from above, but more often at the request of those very towns. 
  3. The Spanish Inquisition was an instrument of royal power exercised by the Spanish monarchs rather than the Roman Catholic Church per se. As such it functioned in many ways more as a tool of nationalist unification and control than of religion--though the two were, of course, deeply entwined under "the Catholic Monarchs" and those who followed. 
  4. As a tool of nationalist control, then, the Inquisition is better understood as an early incarnation of modernism rather than as some kind of residue of medieval religion.**
President Obama's rather pedestrian comparison with ISIS becomes much more interesting from this perspective:
  1. Whereas the Spanish Inquisition was fairly mild by the standards of its day, the violence of ISIS is extraordinary by contemporary standards--even if you aren't thinking of liberal democratic ideals but instead the comparably brutal laws of, say, our allies in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps more significantly, ISIS arose from and continues to operate within the lawlessness of terrorism. As I wrote before, Bernard Lewis makes it very clear that the murderous Islamic terrorism of the past half-century has absolutely no precedence in Islamic history nor support in Islamic jurisprudence. It's also worth pointing out the violence of the Spanish Inquisition was sporadic and occasional, whereas the violence of ISIS is systematic and sustained. 
  2. Is ISIS a movement that has gained power through wide public support or is it feared by the majority of the population? I have no idea, though I suspect it's as much the former as the latter. (Some thoughts about the tyranny of the majority might be relevant here--and of course with the Spanish Inquisition as well.)
  3. Is the violence of ISIS and other Islamic terrorists groups primarily religious in origin or does it come from other sources? ISIS claims that they are motivated by and acting on behalf of Islam. Claims don't always match reality though, and I don't know the movement nearly well enough to ascertain if there are other or greater motivations at work. David Sessions, among others, argues that religion, as such, doesn't really exist, so you can't attribute Islamic terrorism to Islam and should instead look at other structural factors--assimilation versus alienation, social and economic exclusion, etc.--to understand these violent actions. There's something to what he says, though I'm less than convinced by the neo-Marxist line of thought that reduces religion into a mere smokescreen for the real issues. 
  4. Sometimes pundits speak of ISIS or Al Qaeda as "throwbacks" to the Dark Ages. But it's worth repeating that Islamic terrorism is a patently new phenomenon with basically no historical precedent in the Muslim world. So in this sense, there's a rather interesting comparison between ISIS and the Spanish Inquisition to be made. Both are seen as archaic medieval institutions, but both actually serve new and perhaps surprising ends.
I heard Ayan Hirsi Ali speak at a Hillsdale event some time back. A member of the audience asked if Islam could or would undergo an "enlightenment" in the same way that Christianity moved from the Dark Ages of religious violence into a new age of tolerance and pluralism. There are a number of questionable premises built into that question. For one thing, the idea that the wars of religion represented the last gasp of Dark Ages zealotry followed by the wonderful benevolence of the modern nation-state is highly dubious, to say the least. And I rather wish Hirsi Ali would have pointed out that the European "Dark Ages" happened to coincide with the great flourishing of Islamic civilization, but of course that wasn't her response.

Assumptions about the progressive nature of history manipulate us into construing wholly new phenomena as old and reactionary forces. I suppose there's some comfort in thinking of ISIS as outdated, as doomed to the "ash heap" of history. But it's the kind of comfort you only get when you divorce a phenomena from its history.

[*President Obama just said "the Inquisition," which could refer to the Roman Inquisition, as distinct from the Spanish Inquisition. But given the former's comparably mild record and reputation, I'm assuming he meant the latter.]
[**Off the top of my head, I don't recall how or if Kamen unfolds the thread of the argument laid out in #3. So #4 may be more my own gloss on Kamen rather than his specific argument--but I do think #4 is logically embedded in point #3.]

Friday, January 30, 2015

Stephen Greenblatt's The Swerve is not a new book, but it's still plastered all over the history section at Barnes & Noble--with National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize prominently displayed--so it's still worth pointing out that it is a distinctly bad book.

Jim Hinch's old and somewhat infamous takedown of The Swerve, then, still merits attention:
Simply put, The Swerve did not deserve the awards it received because it is filled with factual inaccuracies and founded upon a view of history not shared by serious scholars of the periods Greenblatt studies. That such a book could win two of America’s highest literary honors suggests something doesn’t work in the awards system itself.
Read his whole review here. It's worth your time if (a) you've read the book (b) you're intrigued by it (c) you still talk about the medieval period as some benighted "Dark Ages" where learning died or (d) you tend to assume that the big non-fiction book awards reward quality.

Saturday, December 20, 2014

On Difference and Equality

The Imaginative Conservative has published my essay "On Difference and Equality" today. Here's an excerpt:
To twenty-first-century ears, aspects of President Jefferson’s letter sound shockingly condescending—in keeping with convention and Captain Hendrick’s manner of address, President Jefferson refers to Captain Hendrick as “my son” and his tribe as “my children,” for instance. Still, compared to many earlier and later European and American responses to the Native Americans, Thomas Jefferson’s letter is remarkable in its open-handedness and its recognition of the Native Americans’ shared humanity. His words are suffused with liberality and even hospitality. That generosity and promise, though, entirely depended on Captain Hendrick’s tribe giving up and rejecting their distinct way of life and living instead under the foreign laws and customs of the young American republic. 
President Jefferson’s letter, in other words, implicitly assumes an antagonistic relationship between difference and equality. In so doing he reveals a generally unspoken premise that has often plagued many of the various movements that have, over the past two centuries, sought equality for the unequal and voices for the voiceless. This mindset suggests that in order to have equality you cannot have difference. Indeed, sameness and equality become indistinguishable. As a result, the work of ensuring equality transforms into the task of erasing difference. 
This assumption dominates the thinking and actions of other European colonists and American settlers who sought a place for Native Americans, both before and after President Jefferson. The attitude can be found, too, among those fighting for the equality of Jews in nineteenth-century Germany. And, despite an abundance of multicultural language embracing diversity, it constitutes the unspoken premise of advocates for equal rights in debates that rage today.
I go on to argue that, although the modern ideal of equality has roots in Christianity, the language of "equality" insufficiently expresses the Christian doctrine of infinite human worth. Christianity provides an alternate way of embracing difference through a universal recognition of human dignity--rooted in the Imago Dei and realized by incorporation into the body of Christ. Properly understood in all its implications, this doctrine challenges both liberals and conservatives to reconsider the way they think through difference in human society. Although Christians have often failed to live out this ideal fully, at times in Christian history that promise has been a reality.

You can read the whole thing at The Imaginative Conservative.

Monday, August 11, 2014

History by non-historians

My last post considered William T. Cavanaugh's article on the "wars of religion." I think it's worth noting that Cavanaugh is a theologian, not a historian. Professional credentialing, however, is hardly necessary to make good historical arguments. It certainly helps with detail and nuance--but I also tend to think it makes academics far too cautious. Today's academic historians instinctively shy away from sweeping claims, hiding instead in areas of specialization where their arguments are less vulnerable. But, as I've argued before, since all historical conclusions--no matter how minute and limited--are tenuous, we might as well make big claims and gesture towards sweeping conclusions too.

Cavanaugh doesn't share the contemporary historian's caution, and I am glad for it.

Wars of Religion or State?

My wife's boss sent me "'A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House:' The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State" (PDF available here) by theologian William T. Cavanaugh.

I can't recommend it highly enough.

Cavanaugh's argument has three basic parts. I find the first part convincing. The second part seems reasonable but is way outside of my knowledge, so my ignorance prevents me from endorsing it. The third part is... well, you'll see.

First, Cavanaugh argues that the classic picture of the "wars of religion" is completely wrong. Typically these early modern conflicts have been depicted as the last gasp of medieval religious violence--wars motivated and fueled by religious zealotry. In this telling, the modern state was essentially invented as a result of the terrible violence wrought by religion. It stepped into religious chaos to become the neutral "peacemaker" standing between Catholic and Protestant hatred.

Cavanaugh argues, instead, that the "wars of religion" are better depicted as a fight between the old ecclesial order of the medieval world and an emerging absolutist state which required religion to be relegated to the private sphere. In other words, the modern state was not a peacemaker between the two sides but was instead itself one of the sides in the conflict--and, as it turns out, the victorious one.

One implication, which he does not make explicit, is that, rather than being the last gasp of medieval warfare, the "wars of religion" are actually the first modern wars and are better lumped in with, say, the world wars of the 20th-century than the Crusades.

His second proposition is that the concept of "religion" as a general term for (private) religious beliefs is a modern invention, and that this innovation came hand-in-hand with the rise of the absolute state. As I implied before, this seems reasonable, but I don't know the period well enough to pass judgment at all.

And then comes the third part. Here's an excerpt:
In an article entitled "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," sociologist Charles Tilly explores the analogy of the State's monopoly on legitimate violence with the protection rackets run by the friendly neighborhood mobster. According to Tilly "a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to willing customers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government." States extort large sums of money and the right to send their citizens out to kill and die in exchange for protection from violence both internal and external the State's borders. What converts war making from "protection" to "protection racket" is the fact that often States offer defense from threats which they themselves create, threats which can be imaginary or the real results of the State's own activities. Furthermore, the internal repression and the extraction of money and bodies for "defense" that the State carries out are frequently among the most substantial impediments to the ordinary citizens' livelihood. The "offer you can't refuse" is usually the most costly. The main difference between Uncle Sam and the Godfather is that the latter did not enjoy the peace of mind afforded by official government sanction.
Whew. More:
The State is involved in the production, not merely the restraint, of violence. Indeed the modern State depends on violence, war and preparations for war, to maintain the illusion of social integration and the overcoming of contradictions in civil society. [...] The use of the Church's own practices of binding and loosing is not, however, a call for the Church to take up the sword once again. In fact, it is precisely the opposite. I have contrasted Church discipline with State discipline in order to counter violence on behalf of the State, which has spilt so much blood in our time. Contesting the State's monopoly on violence does not mean that the Church should again get a piece of the action, yet another form of Constantinianism. What I have tried to argue is that the separation of the Church from power did nothing to stanch the flow of blood on the West's troubled pilgrimage. The pitch of war has grown more shrill, and the recreation of the Church as a voluntary association of practitioners of religion has only sapped our ability to resist. The discipline of the State will not be hindered by the Church's participation and complicity in the "public debate." Discipline must be opposed by counter discipline.
And the conclusion:
We must cease to think that the only choices open to the Church are either to withdraw into some private or "sectarian" confinement, or to embrace the public debate policed by the State. The Church as Body of Christ transgresses both the lines which separate public from private and the borders of nation-states, thus creating spaces for a different kind of political practice, one which is incapable of being pressed into the service of wars or rumors of wars.
Think on that for a while, as I am doing right now, and then go read the whole thing (again, you can get it in PDF form here). Then, consider reading his 2009 book titled The Myth of Religious Violence, which I would love to find time to read myself.

Friday, August 8, 2014

Reading 'A Biblical History of Israel'

A Biblical History of Israel, the deceptively titled book I have just finished, does not give a straightforward and thorough presentation of Israel's history via biblical sources. Instead, the authors (Iain Provan, V. Philips Long, and Tremper Longman III) actually cover ground at once more narrow and more ambitiously broad-ranging than that. Naturally, this volume appeals to anyone interested in ancient Israel or the Old Testament, but I believe a broader (or, at any rate, different) circle would find attention to it well-rewarded: those interested in the philosophical foundations and practice of history or even those simply interested in epistemology. What the book really amounts to--what it perhaps could have been more accurately titled--is A Defense of Biblical History.

Let me first say that this is a well-written book. Unlike so much academic production, these authors write with lively, evocative, and humorous prose (as I've written before). It has taken me a long time to finish it, but not because it's dry or does not hold my attention. Quite the opposite. A Biblical History of Israel has essentially been pleasure reading for me--and, as is so often the case with such books, I've been reading it off-and-on amidst many other books and projects.

Part I, which covers about the first third of the book, lays out a thorough and compelling refutation of the "scientific" premises undergirding the modern discipline of history as it was invented in the 19th-century. Even now the general public and not a few practicing historians still assume that hard, objective evidence forms the real basis of our knowledge about the past. The authors of A Biblical History pretty thoroughly demolish that assumption. Time and again they point out that what is often seen as objective evidence actually constitutes faith in testimony. That is to say, we do not so much prove that something happened through the accumulation of unbiased evidence. Instead, we place our trust in people and sources, all of which come to us in contexts and from certain perspectives--and this is no less true of non-textual archaeological evidence than of textual accounts.

In Part II, which covers the rest of the volume, the authors put this idea into practice by examining the history of Israel from the patriarchs to exile and return. They do not provide a rigorous and thorough narrative history. Instead they focus on areas of particular debate or consternation--passages in Scripture that have typically been used to argue for the unreliability of the Bible as a historical account--and examine the causes and assumptions behind those difficulties. What you end up with is a series of case studies plumbing the historical reliability of Scripture and a blueprint for reading biblical history carefully.

Certainly the thrust of the argument is in favor of biblical reliability, but it is not strictly apologetic. The authors do not attempt to answer or refute every argument. They never conclude that external evidence has absolutely proved the biblical narrative, largely because doing so involves giving into premises about external verification that they do not hold. Instead, they typically point out the limitations of all forms of evidence and the often errant presuppositions and assumptions readers bring to the text.

To take a small but representative example, one question the volume addresses is the historical plausibility of the Davidic empire described in the biblical literature. The notion of an empire created and ruled by David has often been assumed to be "an anachronistic retrojection by scribes familiar with the Persian empire." The authors acknowledge that the notion of David ruling a completely dominant and authoritarian empire "analogous to the Egyptian empire, or the Assyrian, or the Persian, or the Roman... is simply not historically credible."

But, they point out, "the Bible never ascribes an empire of that sort to David in the first place." The Bible never describes David ruling an absolute and authoritarian empire. Instead, careful attention to the biblical "description suggests a state of affairs in which David's 'empire' comprised territories over which he gained political control by various means and exercised dominion in different ways and to varying degrees." Given what we know of the period, they conclude that this more limited picture is "entirely plausible."

What we have, then, is a true irony. Contemporary scholars and readers accuse the scribes who set down biblical history of anachronistically attributing Persian imperial features to David, but what has actually happened is that, through inattention to the biblical texts themselves, these scholars have inferred Scriptural claims that do not actually exist. In other words, they have inserted their own anachronistic assumptions about what empire into the biblical narrative, and then they have blamed that narrative for importing anachronisms that could not have existed in David's time. That's irony, friends.

The careful and circumscribed conclusion the authors reach in this case exemplifies the volume as a whole. To find David's empire plausible, they point out, "is not the same as claiming that the Davidic empire has been proven, but imagining what might constitute proof is difficult in any case, once the biblical narrative is set aside." In regard to David's empire, as in so many others areas of biblical history, the question the reader has to answer is, "Do I trust biblical testimony?" The authors do not--and, naturally could never--provide proof positive that could force the reader to trust the biblical testimony. Instead, they show how distrust of biblical testimony is often a priori--that is, the distrust exists prior to and independent of evidence.

Their approach reminds me of N.T. Wright's considered response in Surprised by Hope to denial of the Resurrection: “That is fine; I respect that position [of skepticism towards the Christian account]; but I simply note that it is indeed then a matter of choice, not a matter of saying that something called scientific historiography forces us to take that route.”

Indeed, as I've often said before, history never speaks and never forces. We speak on its behalf. We draw our own conclusions. This is not, of course, to say that our conclusions are in any way arbitrary or immune to evidence, but rather that our interpretation of evidence often follows from assumptions and premises we held long before we ever considered the evidence. To recognize this reality does not free us from obligations to the truth--by no means! The real cop-out is blaming some other force ("history/science/evidence forces me to conclude that...") for your own conclusions. It is an attempt to hold a position without being responsible for it, to make an assertion without being its author. Recognizing that our controlling narratives are largely self- or societally-constructed rather than imposed by external evidence imposes upon us a far greater responsibility, and it should make us far more cautious and circumspect in our conclusions.

You don't have to trust biblical testimony, but you should recognize that your distrust is probably not historical or scientific. It's your own. So own it.

Thursday, July 17, 2014

Daniel Silliman:
All that talk, however, of that imagined idyllic past when Biblical morality was given due deference and Christians had a respected place in the public square is haunted by the Sunday when churchgoers came back from a place called Old Troutman Field with bits of Sam Hose's chopped-up body. 
Silliman has a wrenching reminder on his blog to be cautious with our nostalgia. No matter how cynical or pessimistic you wish to be about the state of the country, "going back" is neither possible nor should it be, ultimately, desirable.

More:
Because this was America, a Christian country, the Sunday crowd that killed Sam Hose was coming from church. More than 500 came from nearby Newnan. Hundreds came from Palmetto, a city slightly to the north. Word of the in-progress lynching reached Atlanta right as people were leaving their morning worship services. According to historian Philip Dray, the news sparked "a mad rush of worshippers to the train station seeking the swiftest possible passage" to the lynching.
Lord, have mercy.

If you have time and attention--and if you can stand to--please read the whole thing. It is detailed and unsparing and brutal and horrifying. It's almost unbearable and hard even to believe that it happened.

Tuesday, July 1, 2014

The Sham of Dividing Metaphysics and Method

"We have no interest in simultaneously being metaphysical theists and methodological non-theists."
-A Biblical History of Israel by I. Provan, V.P. Long, and T. Longman III (2003).

To briefly continue a thought developed in my long(winded) post from a couple months ago on "Knowledge, Coauthors, and Intended Audiences," I am struck again by the difference in the approach of this volume versus Science, Creation, and the Bible, also coauthored by Longman along with Richard F. Carlson. In the latter, the authors write, "Science as a whole should not be classified as atheistic but rather as methodologically naturalistic, not metaphysically naturalistic." As I mused in my earlier post, much of the difference might have to do with co-authorship and audience. Moreover, the former speaks of historical work, while the latter directly addresses science.

Even still, the two volumes work from incompatible epistemological premises. Science, Creation, and the Bible offers a comparatively chastened view of the role of theology--which is not necessarily bad, except that it's paired with a view of science that could perhaps stand a touch more chastening itself. As I pointed out before, "they have too much faith that, so long as it stays within the bounds of the discipline, science remains at heart an empirical exercise" that can be methodologically non-theist without being metaphysically so. In contrast, the authors of A Biblical History recognize that those who become "practical or methodological nontheists" may "find themselves in danger of sliding eventually into metaphysical nontheism." In other words, the boundary between the two is very permeable.

If we suppose, as A Biblical History does (and I agree) that "a connection always exists between the kind of world one believes in and the kind of history that one writes"--in short, if we think that such a division between metaphysics and method, between belief and practice, is ultimately a sham when it comes to historical work, why should the same not apply to science?

Monday, May 5, 2014

Knowledge, Coauthors, and Intended Audiences

(I have a very short follow-up post on the same topic which you can read here.)
We know about the past, to the extent that we know about it at all, primarily through the testimony of others.... We began this section by using the language of "knowledge": how do we know what we claim to know about the past? In truth, however, this question is a concession... What is commonly referred to as "knowledge of the past" is more accurately described as "faith in testimony,"in the interpretations of the past, offered by other people. We consider the gathered testimonies at our disposal; we reflect on the various interpretations offered; and we decide in various ways and to various extents to invest faith in these--to make these testimonies and interpretations our own, because we consider them trustworthy. If our level of trust is very strong, or we are simply not conscious of what we are in fact doing, then we tend to call our faith "knowledge"; but this term is dangerous to use, since it too easily leads us into self-delusion, or deludes others who listen to us or read what we write, as to the truth of the matter. This delusion seems to lie at the heart of the problem with much of our modern writing on the history of Israel. In particular, it is this delusion (among other things) that has led many historians of Israel, in common with many of their colleagues elsewhere in the discipline of history, to make the false move of sharply differentiating in principle between dependence upon tradition and dependence upon "scientifically established" facts.
This comes from a chapter titled "Knowing and Believing: Faith in the Past," in A Biblical History of Israel, cowritten by Ian Provan, V. Philips Long, and Tremper Longman III. The bold emphasis is mine; the italics are original.

The first hundred pages of this three-hundred-page volume are entirely devoted to a defense of biblical history. It's an apology in the face of many scholars who wish (and generally fail) to discard biblical testimony and rely solely on archaeology or other external evidence. I am far from finishing it, but so far it's a compelling, well-written, and entertaining case.

As I read this volume, I have two other things I've recently read--plus one not-so-recent author--bouncing around in my mind: